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1. Introduction  
 
Increasing incidence of hazards and rising levels of human vulnerability 
tend to lead to increasingly intense and frequent disasters. Each disaster 
impacts on various sectors of development and the effectiveness of 
infrastructure. In developing countries like Pakistan, this could lead to 
serious social and economic setbacks to development, undermining 
poverty reduction strategies. Seen globally, disasters also pose as a real 
threat to the achievement of Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).  
Pakistan straddles over a recognized seismic belt bordering various 
active tectonic plates, characterized by its seismic instability. Geological 
and geo-morphological evidence of many seismological sources have 
been found in Pakistan (Kazmi and Rana, 1982). There is a high 
probability of several massive earthquakes of magnitude greater than 8.0 
on Richter scale occurring in the future due to the energy stored along 
the Himalayan arc (ERRA-GoP, 2011). The land has been affected by 
some major disasters including the 1935 Quetta earthquake (30,000 
deaths), the 1974 Kohistan earthquake (5,300 deaths) and the 2005 
earthquake affecting the northern regions (73,000 deaths) (GFDRR, 
2014).  
The devastating earthquake of October 2005 in Pakistan highlighted the 
lack of government preparedness to respond to the disaster. It also 
underlined the need to develop disaster preparedness, prevention, 
response and recovery plans to minimize threats to human life and 
property. The 2005 earthquake in its immediate aftermath led to the 
creation of Earthquake Reconstruction and Rebuilding Agency (ERRA), 
the subject of this paper. ERRA was conceived almost spontaneously, in 
a mater of weeks, as a means to fill in the obvious and almost 
unsurmountable void within the required governance structures, 
planning and management capacity, incidence control mechanisms and 
policy implementation capacity.  
By creating ERRA in 2005, with international guidance and assistance 
the government of Pakistan sought to take on board the 
recommendations of the Hyogo Framework for Action (HFA) that it 
had become a signatory to earlier that same year.  HFA emphasizes 
prioritization of disaster risk management and reduction at all levels of 
government and the creation of understanding and awareness across 
the society (UNISDR, 2005). The framework facilitates integration of 
disaster risk management (DRM) and disaster risk reduction (DRR) 
strategies into all development activity, including those involved in 
reconstruction and rehabilitation. These strategies for disaster 
preparedness and mitigation planning need to recognise and reflect the 
country’s environmental and socio-economic concerns. DRM 
contributes to developing a culture of safety and creating disaster 
resilient communities. The pursuit of comprehensive plans and 
strategies for disaster management and their effective implementation 
requires robust governance mechanisms and implementation agencies. 
These agencies need supportive administrative and legislative 
frameworks within which to operate.  
This paper describes the approach and strategies adopted in the 
creation of ERRA and subsequent governance mechanisms and 
legislative framework that came about, seeking to draw key lessons that 
emerge with particular reference to governance in disaster 
management. The aim of this paper is to analyze the governance and 
institutional aspects of the creation of a high-powered agency to 
provide top-down administration of disaster management policies and 
strategies.  It provides a review of ERRA’s achievements, seeking to 
highlight positive and negative aspects of this bold, large scale attempt 
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to turn unprecedented disaster into an opportunity to install effective 
control mechanisms within the national planning and administrative set 
up for effective disaster management.  
In conclusion, the paper draws lessons from Pakistan’s experience of 
setting up ERRA as a centralized, top-down, peak national agency 
dedicated to dealing with all aspects of earthquake related disasters. 
 
2. Top-Down Approach to Disaster Management 
 
Some authors, while acknowledging the importance of bottom up grass 
roots approach, argue that the ‘management’ part of disaster 
management requires a fundamentally top-down approach. Others, 
however, suggest top-down approach is equally important from the 
emergency manager’s view-point when disasters and their impacts have 
to be managed. As King (2008) suggests:  
In a post-modernist world, the top-down approach is easily labelled an 
old paradigm of command and control. The reality for emergency 
managers is that they are necessarily at the top and have the 
responsibility to manage and plan for diverse and complex crises, 
through a layered and hierarchical system.  
King 2008 quoted in Cerqua and Rapicetta 2014, pp.251-252: “While 
defending the top-down approach, King (2008) seems to suggest that 
it’s effectiveness would depend on the extent to which it percolates and 
engages all levels of community and stakeholders.” This suggests there is 
a case for adopting a top down approach if conscious effort is made to 
ensure that initiatives are tied down to the community level and are 
inclusive. However, it is contended that this essentially requires equally 
strong bottom-up efforts to ensure connection from the grass roots 
level. In other words, where the governance structures positively 
include civilian institutions and community organizations, the desired 
percolation and engagement could be conceived to make top-down 
initiatives succeed. In the case of developing countries with weak 
democratic set ups, however, such integration is less likely to 
materialize. 
In analyzing the case of South Korean situation, a fairly developed 
economy with moderately established democratic traditions, Kwon et 
al. (2011) conclude that public participation in the area of disaster 
management is often reduced to ‘pseudo’ participatory practices. The 
essentially ‘bottom-up’ policies deliberately promoted by the 
government often translate into  ‘pseudo’ bottom-up planning practice 
because the extent of people’s autonomous participation and 
cooperation with the public sector remains partial at best.  
Kwon et al. (2011) attributed this situation to shortcomings both of the 
government as well as the community. The government seems to find it 
difficult to resist the efficiency and convenience offered by top-down 
approaches; and it lacks trust in the private sectors’ willingness to 
participate and contribute. Meanwhile, the community largely fails to 
see natural hazard mitigation as a human rights issue, leading to apathy 
within some sections of the community. Many of those not directly 
afflicted by the disaster refrain from participating as they view the 
government’s disaster management initiatives as just another 
construction program meant to expend the recovery and relief budget.  
The case of ERRA in Pakistan presents a case where the top-down 
‘command and control’ approach for disaster management was 
attempted in a context characterized by weak governance institutions 
and democratic traditions. ERRA, with its military-influenced 
organizational set up, has been generally hailed as a successful initiative 
in terms of delivering clearly defined targets efficiently and effectively.  
Coppola (2007) maintains that the coordination of disaster management 
tends to adopt the ‘command and control’ model whereby the 
operations are conducted through strict hierarchy. These operations 
often tend to be controlled by experts who could be police or military 
personnel (Coppola 2007 in Megan Krolik, M). Meanwhile, Albert 
(2011) maintains that command and control is “an essential part of all 
emergency management operational activity” .. and it “helps the incident 
commander achieve organized engagements in emergency management 
through coordination of the incident management team, application of 
resources, and dissemination of information.”  
The paper seeks to determine whether the experience of setting up 
ERRA and subsequent development of authorities and planning systems 
have improved the effectiveness of governance of disaster management 
overall in the country.  
 
3. The 2005 Pakistan Earthquake 
 
 
On 8 October 2005, an gigantic earthquake measuring 7.6 on the 
Richter scale struck Pakistan. The death toll was a staggering 73,000 
people while another 130,000 were injured. Approximately 600,000 
homes were destroyed, rendering 3.5 million people homeless. Around 
6,000 schools and colleges and 574 health facilities (amounting to almost 
75% of total health facilities in the area) were destroyed. There was also 
extensive destruction and damage caused to roads (affecting around one-
third of primary roads in the affected area). Sanitation facilities, power 
supplies, telecommunication infrastructure and other amenities were 
similarly destroyed. The earthquake also caused widespread 
environmental damage in the shape of land shearing and landslides, 
flooding, blocked rivers and springs, and destroyed woodland (ERRA-
GoP, 2010). The epicenter of the quake was 90 km northeast of the 
capital city, Islamabad. While the devastation it caused was both massive 
and widespread, nine districts - five in Khyber Pukhtun Khwa (KPK) 
and four in Azad Jammu & Kashmir (AJK) - were worst affected.  
While the enormity of the impact of the disaster due to the 2005 
earthquake necessitated an immediate and large-scale response, Pakistan 
did not have the institutional capacity to undertake the tasks involved. 
The immediate emergency rescue and relief phase was handled by the 
hastily created Federal Relief Commission along with existing agencies 
of the Federal and provincial governments, the Army, and international 
aid organizations, among others. It was soon realized, however, that 
recovery, reconstruction and rehabilitation phases would require 
dedicated institutions operating over the medium to long term that had 
requisite skills and capacity. It was this realization that led the 
Government of Pakistan to create of the Earthquake Reconstruction and 
Rehabilitation Authority (ERRA) on 24 October 2005 (ERRA-GoP, 
2010).  
The approach towards dealing with disaster is constantly evolving. From 
a ‘fire fighting’ emergency response primarily concerned with providing 
relief, the focus has shifted to reconstruction and rehabilitation. There is 
increasing emphasis on disaster risk reduction through preparedness. 
The focus has shifted from helping victims to reducing vulnerability 
through disaster preparedness.    
 
3.1  The Creation of ERRA 
At the time Pakistan faced ‘the most debilitating natural disaster in its 
history’, there was barely any adequate administrative or institutional 
capacity to handle natural disasters. Yet, the feared second and third 
waves of deaths following the massive catastrophe due to disease 
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epidemics and the onset of winter could be averted. This was no mean 
achievement. This can be attributed to the effective response and relief 
activities that were promptly undertaken pursuant to the establishment 
of an effective institutional set up in the shape of the Earthquake 
Reconstruction and Rehabilitation Authority (ERRA) to administer the 
immediate response and relief operations. ERRA was established on 24 
October 2005 through a notification with the specific mandate to carry 
out early recovery, reconstruction and rehabilitation tasks. Given the 
scale of devastation, this was a daunting task. ERRA devised a model for 
the resettlement and rehabilitation of the affected areas and initiated the 
creation of a disaster risk management authority.  
ERRA was set up as a statutory authority at the federal government level 
with the mandate to handle all early recovery, reconstruction and 
rehabilitation work in the earthquake-affected areas. The authority was 
thus responsible for policy planning, financing, project approval, quality 
control and monitoring and evaluation. It was also given the task of 
coordinating and facilitating collaboration between various 
implementation agencies. The physical implementation of projects was 
assigned to the relevant provincial governments.  
 
 
4.  The Evolution of Approaches to Disaster 
Management in Pakistan 
 
The conception of ERRA has played a significant role in the way disaster 
management policies have evolved in Pakistan. It may be said that prior 
to the setting up of ERRA, the concept of disaster risk management was 
not established as an essential feature of planning and administration in 
Pakistan.  
In this section we trace the changes to the way disasters have been dealt 
with over the decades since the creation of Pakistan. During the 1950s, 
conventional emergency services relied on institutions such as police, 
fire services and civil defense agency. When faced with disaster 
situations, as and when required, ad hoc institutional arrangements were 
created sometimes in the form of emergency relief cells or crisis 
management cells. For larger scale emergencies the armed forces were 
called upon to play the role of disaster management and response.  
Disaster management was largely focused on providing timely and 
effective response to an impending event, or the mobilization of 
resources and provision of urgent services to restore basic public service 
and facilities and functions in the wake of a disaster. The approach to 
dealing with disaster management during the early decades could be 
largely described as providing emergency response.  Some initiatives had 
been undertaken to revamp emergency services and enhance their 
capabilities in responding to disasters. In 2003, for example, the Interior 
Ministry set up a task force to look at ways to enhance the capacity of 
emergency services to respond to disasters in a more comprehensive and 
effective manner. The recommendations of the task force were still 
under consideration in when the 2005 earthquake struck.  
Table 1 provides a brief chronological list of significant disaster 
management related initiatives in Pakistan.  As can be seen in the table, 
beginning with incoherent and fragmented approach towards dealing 
with disasters, serious attempts were made as far back as 1958 as 
legislative framework was put in place and specific cells were created 
with the Federal Cabinet. However, most of the earlier initiatives can be 
seen as reactive responses to emergency situations, with a focus on 
managing the provision of disaster response in the form of relief and 
Year Disaster Management related initiatives Scope/ Nature of initiative Approach 
1952 
Establishment of Civil Defence Department under 
Civil Defence Act 
Scope limited to fire fighting services. Conventional (casual, 
incoherent) 
1958 
Enactment of National Calamities (Prevention and 
Relief) Act 







Establishment of Emergency Relief Cell (ERC) within 
the Federal Cabinet Secretariat; and 
Establishment of Relief Commissions at provincial 
government level 
Steps towards organizing disaster response at the federal 






Initiation of Floods Control Program in the 4th Na-
tional Five-Year Plan 
Application of a national scale planning approach to deal 




Drafting of National Disaster Plan by the Federal 
Emergency Relief Cell 
Attempt to create organizational set-up; define functions 
of implementing agencies and establish standard proce-
dures for the monitoring of disaster operations - not 




Drafting of Pakistan Emergency Service Ordinance & 
Pakistan Emergency and Fire Code in 2002 
  
Following a massive fire in Islamabad, a new national 
safety code dealing with fire, explosions and other haz-





Signing of Hyogo Framework for Action 2005-15. Pakistan became a signatory to international disaster risk 
management protocol 
International compliance  
& benchmarking 
8 October 2005 
Massive Earthquake leads to Paradigm Shift 
 2005 
Setting up of Federal Relief Commission – immedi-
ately followed by formation of Earthquake Recon-
struction and Rehabilitation Authority (ERRA) 
Spontaneous centralisation of relief, recovery, recon-
struction and rehabilitation tasks under one agency 
Sudden shift from reactive 
to proactive approach 
2006 
Merger of FRC within ERRA in March 2006 
Promulgation of National Disaster Management 
Ordinance 
National Disaster Management Act 2006 was enacted 
A comprehensive legal and institutional system of disas-
ter management created to enable a comprehensive 
disaster management framework for the entire country 
Consolidation of Proactive 
approach 
Table 1 Chronology of Disaster Management Initiatives in Pakistan 
Note: This Table is developed by the Authors by using data from various sources 
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compensation to victims. Later attempts to develop more 
comprehensive response capacities to disasters were generally 
inconclusive. The October 8, 2005 earthquake brought about a 
paradigm shift in the approach towards disaster management in 
Pakistan. This led to the creation of ERRA that consolidated and 
centralized relief, recovery, reconstruction and rehabilitation tasks 
under the purview of a single agency. It also ushered in a shift from the 
reactive to a proactive approach towards disaster management. The 
establishment and successful performance of ERRA has led to the 
eventual setting up of a National Disaster Management Authority tasked 
with the comprehensive management of disasters across the country, 
thereby consolidating the proactive approach through DRR.  
It can be concluded, therefore, that the creation of ERRA allowed the 
government to turn the devastating earthquake into an opportunity to 
reform the approach towards disaster management within the national 
administrative and governance set up.  
 
5.  ERRA – Organizational Structure 
 
ERRA is an entity created from scratch and formulated relatively 
recently with international guidance and support. While its conception 
and timing was purely random as it was created in reaction to an 
unexpected and unprecedented earthquake, it happened soon after 
Pakistan had signed the Hyogo Framework for Action. This provided an 
opportunity for international organizations such as the United Nations 
and its agencies to promote the adoption of HFA principles into the 
design of its mandate.  
ERRA is a top-level national peak agency with a hierarchical 
organizational structure. The ERRA Council, chaired by the country’s 
Prime Minister, provides general policy direction. The ERRA Board 
comprises of senior bureaucrats from Federal and Provincial 
governments and some civil society representatives; it is responsible for 
the overall implementation of approved policies and plans. Like many 
government peak agencies in Pakistan, ERRA is organized into a 
number of wings (or sections) and cells, each with specific functions 
and areas of responsibility. Such arrangement aims to facilitate 
specialization and development of expertise in specific areas, promoting 
organizational efficiency. The precise division of responsibilities and sub
-structures within ERRA’s elaborate hierarchical organizational 
structure seeks to ensure its readiness and ability to best respond to the 
issues and deliver tasks.  
The creation of ERRA was largely funded by international donor 
agencies. A positive aspect of donor-driven agenda was the donor 
agencies’ concern with ensuring good governance practices.  The 
design of the organizational structure of ERRA thus reflects its concern 
with good governance in terms of transparency and accountability. 
Along with the various wings of the agency, a Monitoring and 
Evaluation Wing has been also been set up. This wing has a two-fold 
purpose: it is responsible to not only ensure accountability in terms of 
implementation of programs but to also allow course corrections in 
terms of direction setting as needed.  
ERRA’s flagship program, Rural Housing, sits within the Executive 
Wing. This is central to its core business of reconstruction and 
rehabilitation in the earthquake affected areas. The Executive Wing also 
includes a Project Implementation and Coordination Unit (PICU) that 
is tasked with trouble shooting and ensuring timely completion of 
projects. This is evidence of the concern for performance levels in 
terms of implementation. 
Moreover, there are two cells that are not very commonly found in the 
organizational structures of government agencies in Pakistan. One of 
them is the Knowledge Management Cell, charged with the 
documentation and dissemination of experiences and lessons learned. It 
produces annual reviews and sectoral case studies and disseminates the 
information through newsletters and the ERRA website. The other cell 
is the Media Cell responsible for handling public relations and the 
publicity and projection of ERRA’s performance. It handles all media 
related issues and organizes media coverage and response through press 
conferences, etc. While these cells are not uncommon per se, they are 
rather rare to find within the Pakistan bureaucracy. 
Another important aspect of the organizational structure is the tasking 
of one of the four Planning Wings with the softer side of planning, that 
is, the social sector. Rather than focusing on the technical issues of 
dealing with the design and provision of infrastructure, or land and 
housing or dealing with planning and the legal frameworks, it deals 
closely with the community. This Social Security Planning Wing deals 
with provision of social protection; consideration of environmental and 
Figure 1 ERRA’s Organisational Structure 
(Source: ERRA, 2005) 
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gender issues; and the restoration and enhancement of livelihoods 
and economic development.  The inclusion of such elements within 
the organizational structure is perhaps reflective of the concerns of 
international agencies concerned with promoting HFA and related 
principles.  
ERRA may be defined as a hybrid organization. While the Prime 
Minister holds the chair and Deputy Chair responsible for the day-to
-day operations is a serving army general, ERRA holds the status of 
an autonomous body corporate. The human resource pool that 
services ERRA, meanwhile, comprises personnel with varied 
backgrounds. In addition to active and retired members of armed 
forces, there are also those coming from civilian outfits including 
public service as well as private sector. Among private sector 
personnel, many had previously worked for professional 
consultancies, donor agencies or NGOs. The staff thus includes “civil 
servants, technocrats, armed force personnel and contractual 
employees”. Their diversity of backgrounds presents the organization 
with a wide range of expertise, perspectives and experience from 
which to draw its management strategy towards earthquake 
response.  
 
6.  Integration of HFA’s Disaster Risk 
Management Principles 
 
The Hyogo Framework for Action (HFA) principles have been 
integrated into ERRA’s operational mandate. The emphasis on 
prioritizing disaster risk management is reflected in the 
organizational structure in the form of a DRR section reporting 
directly to the office of the Deputy Chair.   
Pakistan had become a signatory to the HFA in January 2005, a few 
months prior to the earthquake. With international attention still 
focused on Pakistan following the 2005 earthquake, ERRA initiated 
its disaster risk management (DRM) program in line with Priority-5 
of the HFA. It secured funding for this purpose from the World 
Bank and technical assistance from the United Nations Development 
Program (UNDP). The DRM program aims to promote community 
resilience in the face of disasters in the future through increased 
awareness about disasters and enhanced institutional capacity. The 
three-fold objectives of the DRM program include: raising awareness 
for enhancing community resilience by developing awareness 
response tools; mainstreaming disaster risk reduction within the 
planning processes at the district level; and, making available hazard 
and risk maps and related information to district authorities.  
Through its DRM program, ERRA sought to put in place disaster 
reduction policies designed to help communities become resilient in 
the face of natural hazards as well as to ensure that development 
activities do not contribute to increased vulnerability of the 
community to hazards. This amounted to introducing a fundamental 
shift in approach whereby risk reduction was seen as an ongoing task 
across the broad spectrum of activities across social, economic, 
governmental and professional sectors. This was a significant break 
from the conventional approach towards risk reduction as a 
specialization of the armed forces or emergency services.  
With ERRA operational in the earthquake affected across KPK and 
AJK, there was a growing popular opinion that a more permanent 
state of institutional preparedness was needed in the longer term. In 
2006, the President of Pakistan promulgated the National Disaster 
Management Ordinance (NDMO), introducing a multi-tiered 
national disaster management system in the country. This eventuated 
in the establishment of the National Disaster Management Authority 
(NDMA) in 2007. The NDMA was tasked with providing a 
comprehensive disaster management framework for the entire 
country, supported by a comprehensive legal and institutional system. 
The stated purpose of setting up NDMA was to enhance the country’s 
capacity to handle subsequent disasters by incorporating DRM as a 
comprehensive framework for planning and management of all stages 
of disaster preparedness and management. The creation of NDMA was 
seen as a consolidation of a country-wide system of disaster 
management through at all levels of government from federal to 
provincial to district. While both NDMA and ERRA coexisted, there 
was no formal demarcation or reconciliation of the mandate of the 
two authorities. 
 
7.  ERRA’s Achievements 
 
ERRA has proven its capacity in terms of efficient and effective 
delivery of set targets. The authority boasts high rate of success in 
achieving performance targets in terms of delivery of reconstruction 
projects at the ground level in the face of almost unsurmountable 
challenges since its inception. ERRA has undertaken a wide range of 
projects clustered into three areas: outreach; social services; and 
public infrastructure. Throughout these projects, it focuses on disaster 
risk reduction (DRR), gender equality, and environmental safeguards 
(http://www.recoveryplatform.org/). Changes in political leadership 
during the operation of ERRA meant changing political priorities. This 
is reported to have impacted the pace of reconstruction activity. 
According to a report, ERRA enjoyed strong support from the 
national leadership during its initial years when it could “take quick 
decisions without having to go through the usual bureaucratic 
bottlenecks” (GFDDR 2014, p.28). This seems to have changed with 
the change of government in 2008.  
Despite this, the performance in terms of delivery of projects on 
ground has been impressive. Out of a total of 14,243 projects 
targeted, between October 2005 and January 2013, as many as 9,162 
projects had been completed (ERRA Newsletter, February 2013). The 
current status as reported on the ERRA website (http://
www.erra.pk/) as on May 27th, 2015, shows that number of projects 
completed had increased reaching up to 9,824 projects.  It reported 
that 96% projects were completed; 3% were under construction; 
and1% projects were in the planning phase. The ERRA Newsletter 
also reports that having constructed 600,000 earthquake resistant 
houses, it had won the United Nations' SASAKAWA Award.  
Notwithstanding its impressive track record of achievements in an 
efficient and timely manner, ERRA was beginning to be seen by some 
quarters as redundant or having run out of its expiry date. While the 
creation of NDMA after ERRA had consolidated disaster management 
operations was largely seen as the logical next step of evolution of a 
comprehensive national disaster management governance system, it 
was also being seen by some to have made ERRA redundant.   
 
8.   ERRA and NDMA – Duplication of mandate 
 
ERRA originally came into being by means of a notification by the 
Prime Minister’s Secretariat (notification number F. 1(4)/2005, dated 
24th October, 2005).  This was followed a year later by the creation 
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of the National Disaster Management Ordinance (NDMO) 2006 by the 
President of Pakistan that created NDMA.  
A couple of years following the change of government in 2008, the 
National Disaster Management Act 2010 was introduced in April. This 
act consolidated the legal status of NDMA and ushered in a national 
system of disaster management governance. Through the 18th 
amendment to the national constitution, the way was paved for 
delegation of a number of federal functions to the provincial 
governments through the enactment of National Disaster Management 
Act 2010. As a result, the provinces have been given specific disaster 
management responsibilities within the overall national framework. 
Each Provincial Disaster Management Authority (PDMA) has thus been 
charged with the responsibility to administer disaster risk management 
(DRM) tasks within their jurisdiction.  
The following year, another act was passed, called the ERRA Act 2011. 
This act consolidated the legal status of ERRA, which had originally been 
conceived through a notification by the Prime Minister. Both acts were 
applied retrospectively from 2007. The ERRA Act 2011 provides 
sweeping powers to ERRA as an autonomous body corporate to 
override other laws as required, and make rules and regulations. It also 
empowers ERRA to disregard provisions of the Industrial Relations 
Ordinance 2002. It is also reported in the media that the government 
considered renaming ERRA as “National Reconstruction & 
Rehabilitation Authority (NRRA) with a mandate to work countrywide 
in case of any natural calamity instead of being limited to KP and 
AJK” (Business Recorder, Feb 27 2015).    
Meanwhile, there has been a widespread feeling that the original 
conditions creating the need for ERRA were of a one-off nature. The 
unique set of factors that created the context for ERRA’s creation had 
lost their relevance over time, much of that being attributable to the 
very existence of an efficient ERRA. In other words, having achieved 
its objectives, the utility of ERRA was diminished. Another criticism 
against the continued existence of ERRA was its narrow focus, being 
mandated to deal with earthquakes rather than other forms of 
disasters. This point was perhaps highlighted and amplified by the 
recurrent floods between 2011 and 2013. Such ideas may also have 
been promoted due to changing political climate within the country. 
 
8.1   The Enactment of ERRA and NDMA 
 
The NDMA and ERRA enactments in 2010 and 2011 respectively have 
created a situation whereby ERRA and the NDMA co-exist. Soon after 
the enactment of ERRA in 2011, a newspaper article in 2011 reported 
concerns raised at the National Assembly over the co-existence of two 
organizations with a similar mandate. According to the news report, 
the NDMA advised the government to disband ERRA. It maintained 
ERRA Act created an institutional anomaly whereby both NDMA and 
ERRA shared the same responsibilities regarding earthquakes (The 
News, December 11, 2014).  
The point to be noted here is that while ERRA focused on 
earthquakes, NDMA also covered earthquakes due to its broader ambit 
of responsibility. The news article also reported NDMA as stating 
“ERRA was created as a time-bound organization for reconstruction in 
the nine affected districts after the 2005 earthquake, thereafter it had 
to be dissolved.” The NDMA reportedly argued against the 
“continuation of ERRA beyond its original mandate” because “the 
government can ill afford a huge organization in the waiting for a 
disaster which may or may not happen” (The News, December 11, 
2014). 
 
Aspect ERRA Act 2011 NDM Act 2010 Difference 
Short title Earthquake Reconstruction and Rehabilita-
tion Authority Act 
National Disaster Management Act N/A 
Effective from To take effect from 1st July 2007 retrospec-
tively 
To take effect from 17th August 2007 retrospec-
tively 
No difference – but ERRA 
effectively pre-dates NDMA 
Coverage Whole of Pakistan Whole of Pakistan No difference 
Purpose An Act to set up a dedicated authority 
(ERRA) 
An Act to provide for an effective national disas-
ter management system 
ERRA – a single purpose agen-
cy 
NDM – system/ framework 
Scope Post disaster damage assessment, recovery, 
reconstruction and rehabilitation of the areas 
affected by earthquakes 
Framework for regulation of the national disaster 
management system to overcome unforeseen 
situations. 
ERRA - Earthquake specific 
NDM – general coverage of all 
disasters 
Area of focus Geographic focus on areas affected by earth-
quakes 
Geographic focus on areas within the country 
affected by any kind of disasters 
ERRA – focused on earthquake 
prone areas 
NDMA – no specific area focus 
Nature of 
business 
Providing legal basis for setting up ERRA as 
an entity autonomous in tis functions and 
operations and a body corporate. 
 Assigning ERRA the responsibility for all 
reconstruction, rehabilitation & early recov-
ery, recovery programmes & projects. 
Providing legal basis for setting up NDMA, as 
well as DMAs at Provincial and District levels. 
 Assigning NDMA the responsibility for prepara-
tion of National, Provincial and District Plans for 
disaster risk management 
  
ERRA – a powerful, resource-
ful single purpose agency 
NDMA – a comprehensive 
planning system of disaster risk 
management 
Table 2 ERRA Act 2011 and NDM Act 2010: A Comparison  
Note: This Table is developed by the Authors by comparing ERRA Act 2011 and NDMA Act 2010. 
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8.2   Winding Down ERRA? 
 
There have been reports about the government deciding to wind up 
ERRA. According to a 2014 newspaper article, ERRA “has become a 
white elephant over the past few years” (The News, December 11, 
2014). The article details the deliberations of a committee of the 
Cabinet Secretariat that “formulated the blueprint to disband” ERRA. 
The minutes of the committee are quoted as stating the government 
would fund all on-going projects undertaken by ERRA scheduled for 
completion by December 2015, “while the residual portfolio of the 
ongoing projects will be transferred” to the respective provincial 
governments and NDMA. The report further detailed the possibility of 
absorbing ERRA’s workforce within the National Disaster Management 
Authority or elsewhere (The News, December 11, 2014). It seems that 
there was a proposal to maintain ERRA as a self-sustainable 
organization, which was not approved by the committee. While 
acknowledging ERRA’s good performance in initial stage, the Chief 
Secretary of Jammu and Kashmir claimed no significant progress had 
been made during the previous two years.  
 
9.  An Assessment of ERRA 
 
A report by the Feinstein International Center (FIC) (2008) on ERRA 
acknowledges the military’s “effective and highly praised leadership of 
the relief phase” (Wilder 2008, p.74), but it is critical of its 
reconstruction efforts. According to this report, some donor agencies 
felt that “while the military culture was effective in leading the 
emergency relief phase, it was not well-suited to a longer-term 
reconstruction phase requiring community involvement and building 
consensus” (Wilder 2008, p.73). A concern was also raised about “the 
establishment of ERRA .. [regarding the] negative impact that this 
parallel bureaucracy would have on provincial and district 
governments” (Wilder 2008, p.73).  
The report highlighted “the lack of an exit strategy for ERRA and the 
military. It quoted a UN official as stating ‘There is a disconnect as the 
government has no strategy to empower line ministries to take over 
ERRA’s role after two-three year.’” (Wilder 2008, p.73).  
Meanwhile, Bukhari (2011) claims that according to the NDMA, while 
the disaster management system was provided the required political 
support at the federal government level, the support was found lacking 
at the provincial governments’ level. It pointed out that the Provincial 
Disaster Management Committees (PDMCs) had not met in three of the 
four provinces. The situation made it difficult for the newly formed 
bodies to take up a leading role due to the confusion created because of 
parallel laws and duplication of institutional responsibilities (Bukhari 
2011). 
The procedure for winding down ERRA has become a tricky affair 
because of the overwhelming powers granted to ERRA as a corporate 
entity in the 2011 ERRA Act. Section 26 of the Act stipulates a 
resolution needs to be passed by both Houses of the Parliament. An 
additional concern is that ERRA is nominated as an executing agency in 
certain international agreements and contracts. A newspaper article 
reported that the winding up of Earthquake Reconstruction and 
Rehabilitation Authority (ERRA) was only possible through an act of the 
parliament because the body had statutory cover (Business Recorder 
2015). It claims that the future of ERRA was questioned in 2011, 
because it was originally established (in 2005) for a period of three years 
(Business Recorder Feb 27 2015).  The newspaper article further stated 
that In August 2013, the then government decided to disband the 
authority but could not do so due to statutory cover enjoyed by the 
entity. 
 
10.    Pakistan’s Disaster Management capability 
 
Moving beyond the earth shattering experience of the 2005 earthquake 
and the recurrent floods between 2010 and 2013, it is pertinent to ask 
in retrospect where Pakistan stands today in terms of disaster 
management capability. While maintaining that much work remains to 
be done, a World Bank report acknowledges, “Pakistan has begun to 
institutionalize disaster risk management activities” (WB 2014, p.17). 
According to a 2014 WB report, the government’s credibility is, 
however, undermined by its lack of “readiness and poorly executed 
responses to natural disasters”. The report lists three major challenges 
in the disaster risk management sector: “i) weak institutional capacity; 
ii) limited effective coordination amongst stakeholders; and iii) lack of 
understanding of disaster risk to inform decision making for 
preparation and resilience” (WB 2014, p.17).  
While noting the creation of NDMA at the federal government level 
and PDMAs at the sub-national level, the World Bank report (2014) 
points to the lack of clarity of their roles and the fact that these 
authorities haven’t yet been made operational at local levels in many 
districts.  
However, while maintaining that much work remains to be done, the 
World Bank report also acknowledges “Pakistan has begun to 
institutionalize disaster risk management activities” (WB 2014, p.17).  
Clearly, there have been positive spin-offs from the creation of NDMA 
and/or ERRA. In describing the Citizen’s Damage Compensation 
Program (CDCP) 2011-2014, one of the WB sponsored projects, the 
report describes the CDCP program as a “worldwide success story”. 
This “has become a flagship program for the government of Pakistan”. 
It notes that the CDCP provided the basis for a Future Disaster 
Response Action Plan (FDRAP), “which builds on lessons learned from 
CDCP and other international best practices to provide cash assistance 
for early disaster recovery”. It also notes that the design of CDCP 
served “as a blueprint for provincial responses to floods in 2011 and 
2012” (WB 2014 p. 30). 
 
11.   The value of Command and Control approach to 
Disaster Management 
 
ERRA was conceived as an immediate measure to fill the void of 
institutions dedicated to manage, coordinate and administer large-scale 
disaster responses.  Its sole purpose was defined in its specific mandate 
to handle early recovery, reconstruction and rehabilitation related to 
earthquake related disasters. It was thus set up as an entity at the 
highest level of government, primarily responsible for this task. It 
required all other agencies or organizations, whether in the public or 
private sector including donor agencies, dealing with the impacts of 
earthquakes to channel their efforts through ERRA. This approach 
reflected the government’s primary concern for ensuring coordination 
and efficiency that would allow the optimal use of resources, thereby 
resulting in an effective response in the shape of reconstruction and 
rehabilitation.  
The initial task of ERRA was such that a command and control model 
suited its operations best. Thus it was natural for the military to take 
the lead in its establishment and running. As a hybrid organization it 
brought in the required civilian experts and contractors who were 
assigned tasks against clear deadlines.   With the Prime Minister of 
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Pakistan as the Chair, and the legal status of a body corporate, the 
organisation provided an easy interface for international donors and 
agencies, despite their general reluctance to work with the army. The 
reluctance is likely to have been created due to the perception that the 
political process of community involvement and promotion of local 
leadership was being by-passed in favour of efficient delivery of 
reconstruction targets. However, perhaps the pragmatic view prevailed. 
A report by FIC quotes a UN official stating “As civilian institutions 
don’t function it is in our interests to keep the military involved. 
Civilian structures are dysfunctional in contrast to military structures 
that function and can deliver.” (Wilder 2008, p.73).  
 
12.   Conclusion 
 
The creation of ERRA presented a great opportunity to turn the 
devastating disaster into an opportunity to usher in a comprehensive and 
effective disaster management system in Pakistan while carrying out 
extensive reconstruction and rehabilitation tasks within the earthquake 
affected areas. With weak and dysfunctional civilian institutions, the job 
naturally fell to the armed forces who have had prior experience in 
carrying out relief and rescue operations. The involvement of the army 
and the nature of the initial tasks was best served by a command and 
control model. 
While the command and control model was suppressed in the setting up 
of a modern organizational structure and a hybrid nature of the 
organization, the limitations of the top-down approach to disaster 
management soon became apparent. Yet, the ERRA leadership sought to 
adopt the HFA principles of DRM into their operations. As part of the 
natural evolution, ERRA led to the setting up of a comprehensive, multi
-tiered, nation-wide disaster management and planning system in the 
shape of NDMA. Instead of NDMA becoming the logical next phase of 
governance, both authorities seemed to engage in a tussle of acquiring 
greater legal status, leading to a situation where there appears to be a 
duplication of mandate between them.  
Two lessons can be drawn from this saga. Firstly, while it is tempting to 
seize the moment and usher in reform through any opening that appears, 
it is fraught with dangers. It is important to work out the details 
beforehand to avoid complications, especially where legal structures are 
to be created. It is also pertinent to have in place adequate exit strategies 
where experimentation is required.  
Another lesson that can be drawn is that in planning and public policy 
making, it is important to promote the bottom-up approach. The 
temptation to adopt the top-down approach to deliver results is 
especially strong and perhaps justified in carrying out disaster 
management tasks. However, it is then all the more important to ensure 
the grass roots involvement and participatory planning practices are 
deliberately instilled in all processes and decision-making. While top-
down approaches can successfully and efficiently deliver results on 
ground, those results may not necessarily serve to strengthen political 
participation and community development objectives.  
In the case of ERRA, the positive contribution its existence has made to 
Pakistan is considerable by any standard, yet it has got embroiled in 
unnecessary controversy. This could have been avoided if it had set itself 
a clear date of expiry and/ or merger with the institutions it helped to 
bring about. ERRA could also have concentrated on actively building up 
connections with the community, local leaders and the local 
administration in carrying out its operations, rather than using the total 
support it enjoyed from the national leadership to by-pass bureaucracy 
in the name of expediency. At the end of the day, there is more to 
planning and management and dealing with the community than 
delivering cut and dried tasks. 
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